Russia Military Corruption - In the wake of the Russian military's poor performance in Georgia in 2008, the Russian Federation poured administrative and financial resources into the military. It doesn't work.
Photo: DNR (Donetsk People's Republic) soldiers run on a stretcher carrying a wounded separatist in the disputed area of Mariupol. Fighting continues in the port city of Mariupol between Russian/pro-Russian forces and Ukrainian self-defense forces led by the Azov Battalion. Credit: Maximilian Clarke/SOPA Images/Sipa USA
Russia Military Corruption
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In a 2020 report, the Congressional Research Service identified key areas for reform: modernization of military equipment, combat readiness and integration between the service branches, command and control, electronic warfare, recruitment of professional soldiers, changes in structure of the force and logistics. Many informed observers believed that the Russian armed forces had become significantly more formidable, leading some to argue that Ukraine's smaller and less technologically advanced force would be quickly defeated in the early days of the war.
Russia's poor military performance in Ukraine shows not only that it has failed to achieve many of its stated priorities, but that it has neglected the basic building blocks critical to the effective functioning of military forces. That failure now manifests itself on the battlefields of Ukraine, where its performance is no better than in Chechnya and Georgia.
Like the United States and China, Russia seems to be in love with technology. Claim victories at a regular clip, including intermediate-range nuclear warheads, hypersonic missiles, advanced torpedoes, aircraft and armored vehicles. All states make decisions about prioritizing and allocating resources to different areas of their security services. Countries like the US have the resources to pay for both the technology and nerves of war, such as training and logistics. Russia seems to prioritize one at the expense of the other. Since his public comment about the success of his military reforms is so clearly false, should we also question his claimed advances in technology, such as hypersonic weapons systems?
One area Russia has focused on is munitions, particularly intermediate-range nuclear systems like the Iskander and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) like the Caliber. They say they deployed a hypersonic Kinzel missile in Ukraine, however, the munitions in the video they launched clearly did not travel at 3,800 mph (a slower speed is considered hypersonic). Its performance is poor. Experts will recall that when the Russians fired 26 calibers at targets in Syria and four landed in Iran, they didn't even hit the right country.
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Recent analyzes show that Russian PGMs face a 60% failure rate, while the Russians are using dumb bombs in Ukraine because they do not have enough Russian investment in PGMs, so this Russian modernization can be said to be a small success
Another area the Russians claim to improve is command and control (C2) capability, with the way they organize and use modern secure communications systems. Copying the American innovation of using brigade combat teams as key tactical units of maneuver, a new military district system was created to shift the emphasis to the brigade at the tactical level.
The brigades were reorganized to form Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), where the first battalion of each brigade was made up of professionals, allowing them to deploy quickly and (theoretically) fight efficiently. Unfortunately, if most of the professionals are concentrated in the first unit on the way out and there are heavy casualties during the operation, what is left are conscripts, reservists and other second-tier personnel, which is not good in the long run. Periodic functions.
Another big problem they have is secure communication. The Ukrainians killed seven Russian generals and several colonels because the Russians were using civilian cell phones in an attempt to deliver C2 at the border of the war zone. This is a very easy way for Ukrainians to see where high officials are and target them.
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This failure indicates that the Russians have not invested enough in providing secure C2 assets to their forces. In addition, the Russians lacked the ability to coordinate between different units: BTG to BTG, front-line forces with supporting forces (including fire support), and ground-to-air were just some of the areas where the Russians had significant problems.
During the 2010s, the Russians proudly announced their transition from a conscription-based force to a professionally managed one, along with an upgraded and empowered non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. An efficient noncommissioned officer corps makes the world's most effective military operational at the tactical level.
Unfortunately for the Russians, their system is designed precisely to prevent this. Commissioned NCOs must have information and be able to make decisions while leading. The Russian system is based on strict information control and highly centralized decision-making. Reports are common that Russian soldiers sent to war are still believed to be training in friendly territory. This hurts the Russian military where it matters - on the front lines. It is highly unlikely that the Russian military would allow an NCO force.
One of the main areas the Russians had to change after 2008 was logistics. But again, Russia's armed forces are facing resupply difficulties, resulting in many mechanized units running out of fuel by the side of the road. No fuel means frontline units have no food or ammo. The author worked with a Lithuanian Brigadier General at Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in the Soviet Army before the fall of the wall in 1989. He noted that the Soviets would use existing units and send them into battle. Until their war becomes futile. The army would send new units to support successful areas, instead of rehabilitating broken units by providing them with new weapons, ammunition and people.
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This may have lasted during the Soviet era when the Warsaw Pact allies were there to provide much larger ground forces and additional forces. With 850,000 active forces, the modern Russian army is insufficient to conduct large-scale offensive operations and occupy territories without rearranging units. For Ukrainians
What went wrong with the Russians? A big problem is corruption. Although the Russian Federation has allocated resources to modernize the military (the 2010 State Arms Program alone invested an estimated $626 billion between 2010 and 2020), much of that money has disappeared into the greedy jaws of the Russian state, mainly for oligarchs and
Transparency International assesses the risk of corruption in "critical" and "high" operational budgets in the political oversight, finance and procurement sectors. Polina Belyakova of the Fletcher School reviewed the scandal in depth, saying that both the team and logistics suffered as a result. The cost is difficult to determine, but some estimates suggest that up to 40% of military funding was stolen. Russian publications have reported that service personnel are being fed small amounts of rotten food by contractors apparently blessed by the Ministry of Defense.
It's fair to say that Russian military reforms have been a disaster, and not just for Russia. Their defeat can only be won by the Kremlin's return to the old 20th-century doctrines of using overwhelming firepower on a target like a Ukrainian city and occupying ruins with ground forces.
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G. Alexander (Alex) Crowther is a non-resident senior fellow in the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a practicing professor of cyber issues at Florida International University, and a researcher at the Swedish Defense University.
Ukraine's War of No Return February 07, 2023 Democracy Europe's Border Security Russia Punishes Putin's Aggression February 06, 2023 Europe's Front Security Russia Kosovo and Convoy Diplomacy February 06, 2023 Corruption in Border Security Forces of Russia under democracy Europe. Performance | Dimitar Tilkoff/AFP via Getty Images
Polina Belyakova is a senior research associate at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.
In the early days of the war in Ukraine, Russia's performance was abysmal and unexpectedly disappointing. Russian troops were slow and disorganized and failed to establish control of major cities.
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To explain this surprising development, experts pointed out that the Kremlin had false assumptions about Ukraine's willingness and ability to defend itself. While that may be true, there is another factor that contributed to Russia's inaccurate prewar assessments and poor results on the ground: systemic corruption in the country's defense and security sectors.
At the operational level, corruption in defense procurement undermined logistics
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