Russia Military Failure - A burning tank is seen during the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in Volnovakha, Donetsk region, Ukraine on March 12, 2022.
Two weeks into Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, Western military analysts are watching a humanitarian disaster unfold as they try to make sense of the events on the battlefield. Until now, the war has been characterized only by the unexpectedly poor performance of the Russian armed forces. This can be partially explained by inadequate operational plans based on political wishful thinking and an underestimation of the Ukrainians' determination to resist. Even after the initial failure to capture Kiev, the Russian army is showing serious problems in the logistics and coordination of the various branches of its forces.
Russia Military Failure
All this raises the question of whether the Russian military suffers from incompetent and corrupt leadership or from deeper organizational deficiencies. Russia appears to be struggling to replicate the successful operations of its elite expeditionary force on a larger scale against a well-organized adversary. But the military's approach to power generation also seems to be responsible for many of its difficulties in this area.
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Since October 2021, Russia has deployed battalion tactical groups to the border with Ukraine, occupied Crimea, and later Belarus. The first battalion in each Russian brigade or regiment includes only contract and professional soldiers. The same sometimes applies to the second battalion - VDV airborne forces, all battalions - and the first company, which consists of combat support battalions (such as artillery and air defense) and logistics units (usually transport). This means that during a conflict, the Russian military can quickly build forces without sending recruits and reserves into battle. Such an approach works well for operations intended only for a show of force, such as operations previously conducted close to Ukraine's borders or related only to a low-intensity conflict. For example, the tactical groups of the Russian battalion that rotates in the Donbas made less noise than the recent attempts to evacuate entire garrisons in the deployment of a brigade.
However, the approach reaches its limits in full-scale maneuver warfare. There are reasons why the Russian regular army is divided into brigades and divisions. And these reasons have shown themselves in the last two weeks.
The first issue is coordination. In the weeks leading up to the invasion, Russia deployed army-grade command and control equipment to various battlefields. Operational maneuver groups consisting of approximately 12-20 battalion tactical groups are led by the army headquarters. But in the first - blitzkrieg - phase of the war, there was little evidence that Russia controlled brigade commands between the army and battalion levels. Maybe improvise some in the second stage. When commanders try to direct multiple elements of a force at once, they become overwhelmed and unable to coordinate operations effectively. It is safe to conclude that this is what happened to the Russian soldiers in Ukraine.
This problem is relevant even for combat support troops. For example, four air defense batteries of different divisions are not equal to one air defense battalion. The air defense battalion and regimental command structures must coordinate fire sectors among themselves and with aerospace forces. Without such coordination, air defense units cannot identify friendly aircraft and vice versa. As a result, aircraft cannot effectively participate in close air support operations for fear of being hit by their own air defense systems. They cannot attack radars and air defense systems without risking destroying friendly units - especially if the warring parties use the same military systems. Similarly, anti-aircraft units avoid hitting targets because they cannot distinguish between friend and foe. This is exactly what happened to the Russian military in Ukraine. Kiev's Bayraktar drones destroy Russian air defense systems at an astonishing rate.
Why The First Few Days Of War In Ukraine Went Badly For Russia
Then there are the logistics. Detachments of supply trucks accompany Russian battalion tactical groups to replenish and re-equip. But maintenance and repair shops are an asset at the brigade and division level. Before entering the war in Ukraine, Russian battalion tactical teams spent a lot of time maneuvering near the border, increasing their need for routine maintenance. Now, of course, Russian cars break down regularly due to wear and tear.
If it had understood the true scale of the conflict, the Russian army would probably have entered the battle in a very different structure—brigades, divisions, and armies. But the Kremlin made a political decision to hide the war from the public as much as possible, which means that the army had to build up its forces only through the deployment of battalion tactical groups. This is one of the many cases where President Vladimir Putin and his entourage underestimated the complexity of military operations.
If it had understood the true scale of the conflict, the Russian army would probably have entered the battle in a very different structure—brigades, divisions, and armies.
But it cannot be assumed that, if he wins this war, he has little to fear from the underperforming Russian military. Moscow is unlikely to make the same mistakes when starting a different war for different political reasons.
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Meanwhile, the NATO Response Force is also a loose collection of battalions. Many small NATO states in Central Europe have armies of only a few battalions and lack the internal structure to prepare and fight a high-intensity war. This is why it is so important for NATO to develop integrated force structures.
But the most urgent task for the alliance is to help Ukraine survive. Russia may try to create new forces by forcing conscripts to sign contracts with the military on April 1, 2022, when they officially retire. Before they have the chance to do so, Western countries must urgently increase their military support for the Ukrainian armed forces. Apply sanctions against Russia that are strong enough to collapse the war economy.
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The Russian Military's Debacle In Ukraine
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Content from video platforms and social media platforms is automatically blocked. If external media cookies are accepted, access to those contents no longer requires manual consent. After the failed withdrawal of the Russian army in Georgia in 2008, the Russian Federation poured administrative and financial resources into the army. It is of no use.
Photo: DNR (Donetsk People's Republic) soldiers run over a stretcher carrying a wounded separatist in the disputed area of Mariupol. Fighting continues in the port city of Mariupol between Russian/pro-Russian forces and defending Ukrainian forces led by the Azov Battalion. Credit: Maximilian Clarke / SOPA Images/Sipa USA
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In a 2020 report, the Congressional Research Service identified the main areas of reform: modernization of military equipment, improvement of combat readiness and coordination between service units, command and control, electronic warfare, recruitment of professional soldiers, changing force structure and logistics. Many informed observers believed that the Russian armed forces were significantly stronger, leading some to argue that the smaller and less technologically advanced Ukrainian forces would have been quickly overwhelmed in the early days of the war.
Russia's misguided military engagement in Ukraine has shown not only that it has failed to achieve a number of its stated priorities, but also that it has ignored key elements of building Ukraine.
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